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In the celebrated Theaetetus 147d3-e1 passage Theodorus is giving a lesson to Theaetetus 
and his companion, proving certain quadratic incommensurabilities. The dominant view on 
this passage, expressed independently by H. Cherniss and M. Burnyeat, is that Plato has no 
interest to, and does not, inform the reader about Theodorus’ method of incommensurability 
proofs employed in his lesson, and that, therefore, there is no way to decide from the Platonic 
text, our sole information on the lesson, whether the method is anthyphairetic as Zeuthen, 
Becker, van der Waerden suggest, or not anthyphairetic as Hardy-Wright, Knorr maintain.  
 
Knorr even claims that it would be impossible for Theodorus to possess a rigorous proof of 
Proposition X.2 of the Elements, necessary for an anthyphairetic method, because of the 
reliance of the proof of this Proposition, in the Elements, on Eudoxus principle. But it is not 
difficult to see that Knorr’s claim is undermined by the fact that an elementary proof of 
Proposition X.2, in no way involving Eudoxus principle, is readily obtained either from the 
proof of Proposition X.3 of the Elements itself (which is contrapositive and thus logically 
equivalent to X.2), or from an ancient argument going back to the originator of the theory of 
proportion reported by Aristotle in the Topics 158a-159b passage. 
 
The main part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the evidence for a distributive 
rendering of the plural ‘hai dunameis’ in the crucial statement, ’because the powers (‘hai 
dunameis’) were shown to be infinite in multitude’ in 147d7-8 (contrary to the Burnyeat 
collective, set-theoretic rendering), necessarily resulting in an anthyphairetic method for 
Theodorus’ proofs of incommensurability (contrary to the Cherniss-Burnyeat neutrality 
thesis). The crucial sentence is transitional from (a) Theodorus’ contribution to (b) 
Theaetetus and his companion’s contribution, and the distributive plural follows, in two 
independent ways, from the examination of each of these connections. Thus, for (a) the 
distributive use of ‘hai dunameis’ is suggested (i) in the Theaetetus 147d3-e1 passage itself 
on Theodorus’ lesson, by the obviously distributive use of the same word just before (147d4-
5) but also after (148b1-2) the crucial statement, (ii) in the Scholia in Platonem by the 
relevant comments to the Theaetetus 162e passage, and, with greater detail and clarity, (iii) 
in the Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum, by specifying the type of infinity for 
powers, that arose in Theodorus’ proofs, to be an infinity obtained, distributively, by division 
within each power separately (and not by collecting all powers in a family); and, for (b) the 
distributive use follows from the comments of the same Anonymi Commentarius, according to 
which the idea of Theaetetus and his companion consisted in circumscribing the infinity for 
powers that arose in Theodorus’ proofs, by  passing from that infinite over to numbers and 
the finite, a passage that, in concrete terms, is from incommensurability over to 
commensurability obtained by squaring, and thus again occurring, distributively, for every 
power separately.   
 
 
1. Reconstructions and neutrality for Theodorus’ proofs of incommensurability  
 
According to the Theaetetus 147d3-e1 passage, Theodorus, an elder distinguished 
mathematician, is showing to the two precocious boys Theaetetus and young Socrates 
the incommensurabiity of the line segments a and r, where r is of lengrh one foot and 
a2=Cr2 for C=3, 5,…, 17, C non-square, stopping at 17. The concept of 
incommensurability (‘assumetria’) in the Theaetetus is the same as that given in Book 
X of the Elements: 
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Definitions (X.1, 2 of the Elements). Let a, b be two magnitudes with a>b; we say that 
a, b are commensurable if there are a magnitude c and numbers n, m, such that a=mc, 
b=nc, otherwise a, b are incommensurable. 
 
The reader will not fail to notice that Theodorus starts from C=3, omitting the case 
C=2, well known by that time, evidently due to the Pythagoreans, as Burnyeat notes1. 
The omission may suggest that Theodorus’ proofs are originally due to him and not 
previously known. The basic question concerns the method of proof employed by 
Theodorus. As Hardy and Wright write: ‘The question how Theodorus proved his 
theorems has exercised the ingenuity of every historian.’2. Since the only source of 
Theodorus’ mathematical achievements is essentially the short Theaetetus passage 
under consideration, our only hope to obtain some knowledge on the method 
employed can only be contained in the text of the passage. It is generally agreed that 
any proof of incommensurabilities of the quadratic irrationals falls under one of two 
basic alternatives.  
 
1.1. The problem with Knorr’s reconstruction 
 
The first of these alternatives is a generalisation of ‘the classic indirect proof by which 
it was shown that the diagonal of a square must be incommensurable with its side… 
otherwise the same number will be both even and odd’3, a method already known to 
Aristotle4; we will refer to this method, or any of its variations, as the traditional one. 
However, as explicitly stated in the Theaetetus passage,  Zeuthen correctly has 
stipulated that the method of Theodorus ‘must have been of such a kind that the 
application of it to each surd required to be set out separately in consequence of the 
variations in the numbers entering into the proofs’. Ingenuous modifications of the 
traditional method, so as to conform to the case by case condition set out by Zeuthen5, 
have been proposed by von Fritz6, Hardy and Wright7, and Knorr8.  
 
A feature of Knorr’s reconstruction9 is that it rests on the assumption that Theodorus 
had some difficulty to prove the incommensurability for C=17 and thus his last proof 
was for the case C=15.  Knorr then provides10  a reconstruction, based on 
Pythagorean triads and the arithmetic of relative primes, which somehow manages to 
present a problem at C=17, by dealing with the cases C=4n+3 (in particular 
C=3,7,11,15),  
C=4(2k+1)+1=8k+5 (in particular C=5,13),  
C=4n+2 (in particular C=(2), 6,10,14),  
C=4n (in particular C=8,12),   
while devising a difficulty for the first case of non-square C=4(2k)+1=8k+1, namely 
for C=17. 
                                                 
1 [Burn1], p. 502-503 
2 [HW], p.42 
3 [Burn1], p. 504 
4 e.g. in Analutica Hustera  41a26-31 
5 [Ze] 
6 [vF] 
7 [HR] (pp.41-43) 
8 [Kn] 
9 argued in detail in [Kn], p. 81-83 
10 in p. 181-193 
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Knorr’s reconstruction relies crucially on the interpretation of the word ‘enescheto’ 
(occurring in 147d6) with the meaning ‘entangled in something’, rather than simply as 
‘stopped’ or ‘came to a standstill’; in support of such an interpretation Knorr cites  
Hackforth’ s Notes11. But whether Theodorus simply ‘stopped’ or became ‘entangled’ 
with some difficulty, he could have done so equally at C=17 or C=19, so this 
particular argument does not seem to be favoring one or the other case.  In fact the 
Anonymous Scholiast to the Theaetetus does not agree with Knorr, as he uses three 
times, instead of ‘enescheto’, the words ‘heste’ or ‘stenai’ (namely a simple stop)12.  
Arguments against Knorr’s thesis, that Theodorus became entangled at the case C=17 
not completing it, have been given by Burnyeat13. A further simple argument toward 
the same conclusion follows from the use, in the Theaetetus 147d6, of the word 
‘mechri’, whose unequivocal meaning is ‘as far as’, ‘up to and including’ (in this 
case, the case C=17). Restricting ourselves to Plato, a sample of the occurrences of 
‘mechri’ indicates that the term is used in the inclusive sense only14. 
 
1.2. The anthyphairetic reconstructions  
 
The second alternative is an anthyphairetic method of proof, first proposed by 
Zeuthen15, and followed, among others, by Becker16, Mugler17, van der Waerden,18, 
Fowler19,  Kahane20 [Ka]. In order to describe the method, we recall the definition of 
anthyphairesis (implied in Books VII and X of the Elements): 
                                                 
11 [Ha] 
12 AST 34,35; 35,16; 35,21. 
13 [Burn1], p. 512-513 
14 The other four occurrences of ‘mechri’ in the Theaetetus confirm our claim: ‘I saw Theaetetus as far 
as Erineus’ (143b1-2);‘come with me at any rate until we see’ (169a2)’; ‘Theod….But not 
further…beyond  that I shall not be able to offer myself. So. It will do if you will go with me so far.’ 
(169c6-8); ‘if he were to stick up his head from below as far as the neck just here where we are’ 
(171c1-2). (translated by M.J. Levett, revised by M. Burnyeat in [Burn2]). 
Additional occurrences in Plato confirm our claim: Hippias Major [dub.] 281b5-c8 (‘mechri 
Anaxagorou’, clearly including Anaxagoras); Menexenus  239c7-240a2 (‘o men protos Kutos…mechri 
Aiguptou erxen… tritos de Dareios… mechri Skuthon ten archen horisato’, clearly incuding Egypt and 
the Scythians, respectively)),  242d1-4;  Phaedo109a9-b2, 112e1-3 (‘mechri tou mesou kathienai, pera 
d’ ou’); Cratylus 412c8-d1 (‘mechri men tou homologeisthai…epeita de amphisbetesthai’), 412e2-
413b3; Sumposion  223d3-5 (‘mechri…epeita…’); Politeia 423b9-c1 (‘mechri toutou…pera de me’), 
460e4-461a2 (‘mechri tettarakontaetidos,…mechri pentekaipentekontaetous’, clearly in inclusive sense 
in both cases),  511b3-c2 (‘mechri tou anhupothetou’, clearly arriving at it); Parmenides 153c3-5; 
Sophistes  222a2-8 (‘mechri men…entautha ho sophistes kai o aspalieutes hama…poreuesthon 
…ektrepesthon de..apo tes zootherikes’), 267a4-6; Phaidrus 248c3-5; Timaeuss 67e6-68b1 (‘mechri 
ton ommaton’, clearly including the eyes); Nomoi 744d8-745a3 (‘mechri tetraplasiou…pleiona de..’), 
756a4-b6 (‘mechri duoin…to de triton…’);  771c1-4 (‘mechri ton dodeka apo mias…plen endekados’, 
expressly including twelve), 811c6-10 (‘mechri deuro’, clearly inclusive),  814d7-e4 (‘tes men peri 
palaistran dunameos to mechri deur’…peri de tes alles kineseos’, in a clearly inclusive manner), 855a7-
b2 (‘mechri tosoutou…, to de pleon me’). 
Especially clear and conclusive are the several occurrences of the type ‘till x, but not beyond x’.  We 
may conclude that if Knorr is right in his interpretation of ‘mechri’ in the Theaetetus 147d6, then this 
meaning of ‘mechri’ will be unique in all of Platonic writings. 
15 [Ze] 
16 [Be] 
17 [Mu], p xx-xxv, 174-249  
18 [vdW] 
19 [F] 
20[Ka] 
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Definition21. Let a, b be two magnitudes (line segments, areas, volumes), with a>b; 
the anthyphairesis of a to b is the following sequence of mutual divisions: 
a     = I0 b+ e1, with b>e1, 
b    = I1 e1 +e2, with e1>e2, 
… 
en-1  = In en+ en+1, with en >en+1, 
en     = In+1 en+1+ en+2, with en+1>en+1, 
… 
 
and we set Anth(a, b) = [I0,I1,…,In,In+1,…] for the sequence of successive quotients of 
the anthyphairesis of a to b. 
 
In case a, b are natural numbers, this process, the ‘Euclidean algorithm’, is always 
finite, i.e. it ends after a finite number of successive remainders, and the last (positive) 
remainder divides (measures) the previous remainder, and is in fact the greatest 
common divisor (common measure) of a, b (Propositions VII.1,2 of the Elements). An 
anthyphairesis is infinite if the sequence of successive remainders is infinite. The 
fundamental anthyphairetic connection between incommensurability and infinity is 
contained in the following 
 
Proposition (X.2 of the Elements).22 If a, b are two magnitudes, with a>b, and the 
anthyphairesis of a to b is infinite, then a, b are incommensurable. 
                                                 
21 The modern version of anthyphairesis is the theory of continued fractions of real numbers (>1). An 
exposition of  the basics of  the modern  theory can be found in Hardy and Wright [HR], p. 129-203, 
and Fowler [F], p. 303-355. 
22 The precise statement of Proposition X.2 of the Elements is the following: 
‘If, when the less of two unequal magnitudes is continually subtracted in turn (‘anthyphairated’) from 
the greater that which is left (‘to kataleipomenon’) never measures the one before it, then the two 
magnitudes are incommensurable.’ 
It is important to understand  the exact meaning of remainder (‘kataleipomenon’)  in the statement. Let 
the two magnitudes in question be a, b, with a>b. At the first stage of subtraction, we subtract the 
smaller b from the greater a; is the ‘kataleipomenon’ a-b? No, that which is left will be 
‘kataleipomenon’ only if it ‘leipetai heautou [[of b]] elasson’, namely only if the remainder is smaller 
than  b. Thus if a=kb+c, and c<b, then c=a-kb is the ‘kataleipomenon’, but  the intermediate differences 
a-mb, for m=1,…,k-1, do not count as anthyphairetic remainders. 
Thus the assumption of  Proposition X.2:  
‘If, when the less of two unequal magnitudes is continually subtracted in turn (‘anthyphairated’) from 
the greater that which is left (‘to kataleipomenon’) never measures the one before it’ 
is precisely stated as follows: 
‘Let a, b are two magnitudes, for which there are two infinite sequences, a sequence k1, k2,k3,…of 
natural numbers, and a sequence c1>c2>c3>… of magnitudes, such that 
a=k1b+c1, c1<b, 
b=k2c1+c2, c2<c1,      
c1=k3c2+c3, c3<c2, 
… 
ad infinitum’. 
 
Thus, the notion of  (anthyphairetic) remainder that is meant by Euclid is contained in the following 
Definition. Let a>b be two (homogeneous) magnitudes. If a=kb+c, with k a natural number and b>c, we 
will call c the (anthyphairetic) remainder (‘kataleipomenon’) of the division of a by b.  
In particular the differences a-b, a-2b,…,a-(k-1)b do not qualify as (anthyphairetic) remainders. 
Euclid nowhere mentions the term ‘infinite’ in connection with anthyphairesis, but his notion of 
infinity, implied by the sentence ‘that which is left never measures the one before it’,  is understood by 
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The argument, set out by Zeuthen, in favour of the anthyphairetic reconstruction 
gained initial strength because it conformed with the separate case by case proofs that 
is implied by the Theaetetus passage, but was weakened by the von Fritz and the 
Hardy and Wright23 arguments, mentioned in Section 1.1. 
 
1.3. Critique of Knorr’s argument on the impossibility of a rigorous pre-Eudoxean 
proof of Proposition X.2 
 
At this point we must examine Knorr’s argument against an anthyphairetic 
reconstruction of Theodorus’ method of proof, based not on textual considerations but 
on the possible chronology of Proposition X.2. 
 
First, Knorr correctly points out24 that Theodorus’ incommensurability proofs are 
described by Plato in the Theaetetus as strict and rigorous, and not simply making 
these incommensurabilities seem plausible. Knorr is basing his argument on the 
rigorousness of Theodorus proofs on the interpretation of the word ‘apephene’. Knorr, 
invoking the Parmenides 128e5-130a2 passage, showed convincingly that Plato, at 
least at the time that he wrote the Theaetetus, was using ‘apophainein’ and 
‘apodeiknunai’ (proving)  interchangeably. But in fact Plato himself, as Knorr notes, 
makes sure in the Theaetetus 162e that Theodorus method involved nothing less than 
rigorous mathematical proof. In addition, Plato’s account of Theodorus proofs in the 
Theaetetus was written several decades after their actual occurrence, enough time for 
discovering any weaknesses in his method. We should, thus, have no doubt that Knorr 
is correct on this point and Theodorus proofs are indeed described by Plato as, and in 
fact are, rigorous.  
 
Secondly, Knorr again correctly points out25 that Euclid’s proof of Proposition X.2 of 
the Elements makes use of the Eudoxean definition 4 of Book V, via its use of 
Proposition X.1, and that Eudoxus’ condition was certainly not yet enunciated on 
Theodorus’ time, unless perhaps in some intutive manner.  
 
Knorr then argues that, combining these two points, it must be concluded that 
Theodorus, in his admittedly rigorous incommensurability proofs, could not have used 
a non-rigorous version of Proposition X.2, and therefore his method could not be 
anthyphairetic. But, as we will now explain, Knorr’s argument does not hold out on 
closer inspection. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the following  
Definition. An anthyphairesis will be called finite (or infinite) if it generates a finite (resp. infinite) 
sequence of successive (anthyphairetic) remainders. 
With these definitions Proposition X.2 can now be restated as follows: 
If the anthyphairesis of the magnitudes a, b, with a>b, is infinite, then a, b are incommensurable. 
23 The Hardy-Wright reconstruction assumes that Theodorus was in possession of Propositions VII.1 & 
2, but lacked a general divisibility criterion such as Proposition VII.30 of the Elements: if a prime 
number p divides the product of two numbers mn, then either p divides m or p divides n, and it was for 
this reason  that he was forced to proceed case by case with the proofs of incommensurability. 
24 [Kn], p. 75-78 
25 [Kn], p. 122-123, 256, 274, 301 
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First, as already explained, Euclid, in the Elements, does give, in Proposition X.2, a 
non-elementary demonstration (depending on Eudoxus principle, via Proposition 
X.1), of the statement 
[X.2] if a, b are magnitudes, a>b, with infinite anthyphairesis, then a, b are 
incommensurable, 
It is also true that Euclid, in the course of the very next Proposition X.3, gives a 
completely rigorous and elementary demonstration (not depending in any way on 
Eudoxus principle) of the statement (call it [X.3*]: 
[X.3*] if a, b are commensurable magnitudes, and a>b, then the anthyphairesis of a 
to b is finite, 
Knorr does not seem to realise that Proposition [X.2] is the exact contrapositive26 to, 
and thus logically equivalent of, the elementary [X.3*]. 
 
It is thus seen that Euclid  in two successive Propositions (X.2 and X.3*) presents two 
different demonstrations of the same logically equivalent statement, one non-
elementary depending on Eudoxus condition, the other elementary, mimicking the 
arithmetical Proposition VII.2.  
 
Furthermore, there is good evidence that an elementary proof of Proposition X.2, in 
effect already contained in the Elements, is old, and goes at least as far back as 
Theaetetus. To see this we consider an  
 
Alternative proof of Proposition X.2. 
 
Denote the magnitudes with a, b, and we assume that a>b, and a, b commensurable. 
So there are a line segment c and natural numbers k, m, such that a=mc, b=nc. By 
Propositions VII. 1 & 2, the two natural numbers m>n have a finite anthyphairesis, 
say 
 
m=k1n+p1, p1<n, 
n=k2p1+p2, p2<p1, 
... 
pn-1=kn+1pn+pn+1, pn+1<pn, 
pn=kn+2pn+1. 
 
But then, 
 
mc=k1nc+p1c, p1c<nc, 
nc=k2p1c+p2,c  p2c<p1c, 
... 
pn-1c=kn+1pnc+pn+1,c, pn+1c<pnc, 
pnc=kn+2pn+1c, 
 
namely the anthyphairesis of mc=a to nc=b is finite, contradiction. 
 
The Alternative proof of Proposition X.2 in no way employs Eudoxus’ principle; it 
follows an idea, mentioned by Aristotle in Topics 158a-159b, and goes at least as back 
as the unnamed originator of the theory of proportion of magnitudes based on the 
                                                 
26 The contrapositive of  an  implication ‘p implies q’ is the implication ‘not q implies not p’. 
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equality of anthyphairesis. This theory employs as definition of proportion a/b=c/d the 
condition Anth(a,b)=Anth(c,d), and contains as an obvious, according to Aristotle, 
Proposition the statement:  
if a,b,c are lines then a/b=ac/bc  
(obvious, since it is obvious that  
Anth(a,b)=Anth(ac,bc (*)). 
But (*) is proved in precisely the same way that in the Alternative proof of 
Proposition X.2 it was proved that 
Anth(a,b)= Anth(mc,nc)=Anth(m,n) (**); 
in fact the Alternative proof employs a numerical version of the Topics Proposition. 
But the originator of the anthyphairetic theory of proportion is generally 
acknowledged to be Theaetetus27, hence the idea of the Alternative proof of 
Proposition X.2 was certainly known, and considered obvious, to Theaetetus. The 
obstacle concerning the proof of  X.2 envisaged by Knorr simply does not exist. There 
is no reason, from anything we know, to exclude that Theodorus, and even the 
Pythagoreans, were employing Proposition X.2 as a criterion of incommensurability.  
 
Even though Euclid is admittedly confused28 on the relevance of Eudoxus principle 
on the relation of infinite anthyphairesis with incommensurability, we should not 
conclude from what has been said that there is no such relevance. This relevance, 
which, as we saw, certainly does not arise with Proposition X.2, as Euclid seems to 
believe, does arise with the Proposition Converse to it, stating that: 
[Converse X.2] if a, b are incommensurable magnitudes, a>b, then the anthyphairesis 
of a to b is infinite29. 
or with the, logically equivalent, contrapositive Proposition stating that: 
[Converse X.3*] if a, b are magnitudes, with a>b, with finite anthyphairesis, then a,b 
are commensurable, 
Surprisingly Euclid does not establish anywhere in his Elements the [Converse X.2] 
Proposition (or its equivalent contrapositive [Converse X.3*]), even though it is the 
only one that is in essential need of Eudoxus principle; instead he has needlessly 
employed Eudoxus principle for Proposition X.2 itself. 
 
We conclude: the fact that Euclid is in a curious confusion  
(a) presenting an elementary, but perfectly rigorous proof of a proposition (X.3*) and 
a non-elementary (depending on Eudoxus principle) of its (logically equivalent) 
contrapositive proposition (X.2), and  
(b) omitting any mention of the converses of these propositions (X.2 & X.3*), which 
do depend in an essential way on Eudoxus principle,  
in no way implies that these propositions (X.2 & X.3*) were not available to earlier 
geometers (Theaetetus, Theodorus, and even the Pythagoreans), and does not provide 
an argument in support of Knorr’s thesis against the possibility of a pre-Eudoxean 
rigorous proof of Proposition X.2. 
                                                 
27 [Kn], p. 298-313 
28 It is not likely that Euclid’s  confusion  has to do with contrapositive and  converse statements, given 
his masterly exposition  of, say, the fifth postulate and its contrapositive in Proposition I.29, and of the 
Propositions I.27 and 28, inverse of the fifth postulate, or of Propositions X.8,7, contrapositive to 
Propositions 5,6, respectively). 
29 Note e.g. that if for a>b Eudoxus condition fails, then a,b are incommensurable but their 
anthyphairesis is certainly not infinite, according to the definition of infinite anthyphairesis explained 
in footnote 22, since not even a single anthyphairetic remainder is produced. 
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So there is really no force in Knorr’s argument against a rigorous pre-Eudoxean 
demonstration of incommensurability based on Proposition X.2. 
 
1.4. The Cherniss-Burnyeat neutrality thesis and its problem with the crucial 
statement  
 
(a) The Cherniss-Burnyeat neutrality thesis  
 
By 1.1 and 1.3 above, neither a modified traditional reconstruction (such as the one 
proposed by Hardy and Wright) (by 1.1), nor an anthyphairetic one (by 1.3) can be 
excluded a priori as a model for Theodorus’ method, and no  received reconstruction, 
either ttraditional or anthyphairetic, in any of the variations, claims to find support in 
the Theaetetus passage itself. The dominant thesis, expressed by Cherniss and 
Burnyeat, is that the Theaetetus 147d3-e1 passage is neutral, in that it contains no 
information on the method employed by Theodorus. Cherniss30 states that ‘The sole 
evidence for Theodorus’ demonstration is the passage of the Theaetetus, and that 
reveals only that he began with square root of 3 and selecting one surd after another 
up to square root of seventeen there somehow stopped. This tells us nothing of the 
method that he used’, while Burnyeat writes that ‘We are not told how [Theodorus] 
proved this result’31, and that “Plato has no motive to indicate to the reader whether 
he has in mind any definite method of proof…there is no good reason to expect that 
the answer is to be squeezed out of one ambiguous sentence in Plato’s dialogue’32  
  
The neutrality of the Cherniss-Burnyeat thesis possesses the advantage of minimality, 
of not having to explain too much, and it holds well for the main body of the passage, 
where Theodorus’ lesson is described (147d3-6).  
 
(b) A heuristic discussion suggesting a problem with Burneyat’s rendering of the 
crucial statement 147d7-8  
 
However the immediately succeeding statement (147d7-8), which we will call ‘the 
crucial statement’, 
 
[b] ‘since the powers (‘dunameis’) appeared (or were shown) (‘ephainonto’) to be infinite in multitude 
(‘apeiroi to plethos’), it occurred to us,...’, 
 
needs careful consideration. Burnyeat, who, also calls it a’ key sentence’33, describes  
[b] as  
 
‘recounting the thoughts suggested to himself [[Theaetetus]] and his companion by 
and during Theodorus’ lesson’,  
 
and thus regards [b] as transitional from an account of Theodorus’ lesson, described 
just before [b], in 
 
                                                 
30 [C], p. 410-414, answering the admittedly inconclusive arguments by Mugler [Mu]. 
31 [Burn1], p. 494 
32 [Burn1], p. 505 
33 [Burn1], p. 501 
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[a] ‘Theodorus was writing something about powers for us, about the three foot and five foot power, 
‘apophainon’ that they are not commensurable (‘ou summetroi’) to the one foot line’ (147d3-5) 
 
and renders [b] as 
 
‘since the dunameis34  were turning out(‘ephainonto’) to be unlimited in number, it occurred to us…’. 
 
Thus Burnyeat assumes that Theodorus lesson described in [a] prompted, suggested to 
Theaetetus and his companion the notion that ‘the dunameis were turning out to be 
unlimited in number’ in [b]. Burnyeat does not pinpoint the precise connection 
between [a] and [b] (a linguistic connection that will be explained in section 2), but 
that [b] is prompted by [a] is a reasonable assumption, already suggested by the word 
‘since’ (‘epeide’, 147d7)). The connection between [a] and [b] shows that [b] must be 
taken into consideration in investigating the nature of Theodorus’ lesson in [a], and 
may well throw some light on it, confirming or rejecting the Cherniss-Burnyeat 
neutrality thesis. 
 
Burnyeat considers two possible renderings for [b], namely 
 
[b’] ‘since the series of whole [[non-square]] number squares (or sides of such 
squares) were turning out to be unlimited in number , it occurred to us…’, or 
 
[b’’] ‘since the squares with incommensurable sides were turning out to be unlimited 
in number, it occurred to us…’. 
 
He rejects [b’], namely that Theaetetus’ recounting consisted simply in ‘the idea that 
there is an endless series of whole number squares (or sides of such squares)’, 
presumably because this is a rather trivial conclusion that ‘would hardly need to be 
prompted by a process as protracted as Theodorus’ lesson’, and opts rather for [b’’’], 
namely for the idea ‘that there is an indefinite, perhaps infinite number of squares 
with incommensurable sides’. Thus, according to Burnyeat35, [b] should not be 
rendered as [b’] but as [b’’]. From Burnyeat’s point of view, the rendering of [b] as 
                                                 
34 [Burn1], p.495-502, especially 501-502. Burnyeat writes: ‘Immense heat has been generated over the 
terminology of the passage… The cause of the trouble is that while dunamis is applied to 
incommensurable lines in the definition at 148b1, it is also…used earlier to specify that Theodorus’ 
demonstrations were about, so it has been a matter of controversy whether at that earlier stage the term 
stands for the sides of a series of squares or for the squares themselves, both of which were involved in 
the exercise.’. 
Indeed, in 147d3-6 a power is a square a2 commensurable with the assumed one-square foot square r2 
by a relation a2=Cr2 for all non square numbers C from C=3 to C=17, with its side a, as shown by 
Theodorus, incommensurable in length with the one foot line r; in 148a7-b2 a power is a line a such 
that a2=Cr2 for some non-square number C, and in consequence, as shown by Theaetetus and his 
companion, a line a incommensurable with the one foot line r, with its square a2 commensurable with 
the one-square foot square r2. Thus it may be the case that Theodorus might consider a power more as 
in 147d3-6, while Theaetetus and his companion more as in 148a7-b2. 
Burnyeat argues that the controversy arose ‘through failure to make any distinction between meaning 
and application.’: ‘dunamis is applied to incommensurable lines without meaning ‘line’ or 
‘incommensurable line’’, but is meant to be ‘square’, or ‘square with incommensurable side’. In any 
case, as pointed out by Burnyeat, the difference in the versions of the concept of power is really only 
linguistic, and from a geometrical point of view, inessential. It makes no difference whether we have a 
commensurable square with an incommensurable side, or an incommensurable side with a 
commensurable square. 
35 [Burn1], p. 501-502 
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[b’’] has a distinct advantage: it conveniently disposes of the rather troublesome 
statement [b], by turning it into an innocuous one [b’’] that does not contradict, and 
does not pose any menace to, the basic Cherniss-Burnyeat thesis that Plato provides 
no information on Theodorus’ method of proof.  
 
But there is a problem; Burnyeat evidently does not realize that the rendering [b’’] is 
open to precisely the same criticism that [b’] is: [b’’] ‘would hardly need to be 
prompted by a process as protracted as Theodorus’ lesson’, in fact it would be 
obvious before even the start of Theodorus’ lesson (in no way depending on the 
highly non-obvious proposition that every power is incommensurable to the one-foot 
line, evidently proved by Theaetetus and young Socrates and related to Proposition 
X.9 of the Elements), since, for any number of the form C=2n2, n=1, 2, 3,…(and thus 
for an infinite multitude of non-square numbers C), the incommensurability of the side 
a of the squares a2=Cr2=2n2r2  follows immediately from the Pythagorean 
incommensurability of the side y of the square y2=2r2, an incommensurability that 
Theodorus clearly considers as known at the start of his lesson36. Thus [b’’] was 
known to hold even before the start of Theodorus’ lesson and cannot credibly be 
claimed to be a thought resulting from that lesson.  
 
We can take this logic to its natural conclusion. Theodorus’ lesson would have to 
prompt to Theaetetus and his companion a conjecture stronger than [b’’]. Indeed, 
when someone is demonstrating to you that the sides of squares with 3, 5, 6,…, 17 
square feet are incommensurable to the one foot line, omitting only the square 
numbers  4, 9, 16 and no others, then the reasonable conjecture that might be 
suggested to you by these demonstrations would be, not simply that  ‘…the squares 
with incommensurable sides were turning out to be unlimited in number’, as in [b’’] 
(something which, as we saw, was known before Theodorus’ lesson), but that ‘all 
powers  corresponding to non-square numbers were turning out to have 
incommensurable sides’, as in 
 
[b*] ‘since all powers  corresponding to non-square numbers were turning out to have 
incommensurable sides, it occurred to us…’. 
 
Thus the infinity that enters in [b] cannot reasonably refer simply to an infinite 
multitude of powers, as in the [b’’] rendering, since the only reasonable thought by 
Theaetetus would have to involve all powers, as in the universal statement [b*], 
a statement evidently equivalent to  
 
[b**] ‘since every power  corresponding to non-square numbers was turning out to 
have incommensurable sides, it occurred to us…’. 
 
But statement [b**], as it stands, although it qualifies as an improvement over [b’’] 
for a reasonable description of Theaetetus’ thoughts as he follows Theodorus’ lesson, 
it certainly cannot qualify as a rendering of [b], simply because reference to the 
infinity that appears in [b] is completely missing in [b*].  The role of infinity of the 
transitional statement [b] would have to be a different one than the one assigned by 
the Burnyeat  [b’’] rendering, but an existent one, and we are thus led to a statement 
of the sort 
                                                 
36 We owe this remark to Dr. Andreas Koutsogiannis 
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[b***] ‘since every power  corresponding to non-square number was turning out to be 
infinite, it occurred to us…’. 
 
Thus starting with the Burnyeat reading [b’’] of [b], and subjecting it to two reasoned 
modifications, we come to statement [b***], which is both a rendering of [b] and a 
credible account of thoughts resulting from Theodorus lesson; but [b***] is a 
statement with a meaning that at least at first sight is not clear, and further  is no 
longer an ‘innocuous’ one for the basic Cherniss-Burnyeat thesis, but one putting it in 
jeopardy.  
 
Clarification of the meaning of the statement [b***] and strong support for a [b***] 
reading of [b] will come, as we shall see in section 2, from the Theaetetus passage 
itself and from the ancient anonymous scholiasts to this passage. 
 
2. Incommensurability and infinity 
 
2.1. The anthyphairetic connection between incommensurability and infinite 
divisibility or infinity   
 
Any demonstration of incommensurability, of a magnitude with respect to another 
magnitude, with an anthyphairetic method must necessarily rely on the use of some 
form of Proposition X.2, namely must demonstrate that the process of anthyphairetic 
division of the pair of magnitudes is infinite. Thus, ‘infinite divisibility’, or simply 
‘infinity’, in connection with incommensurability signifies in unambiguous terms 
infinity of their anthypairesis, and thus incommensurability by means of Proposition 
X.2. No other demonstration of incommensurability, such as the traditional in any of 
its forms, is even remotely connected with infinite divisibility or a form of infinity. 
There should then be no hesitation to ascribe an anthyphairestic method any time 
infinite divisibility or infinity is related to incommensurability. The only conceivable 
kind of infinity or of infinite divisibility related to incommensurability is that of 
infinite anthyphairesis, and the only conceivable connection is by means of 
Proposition X.2. 
 
Various ancient commentators do indeed connect incommensurability with infinite 
divisibility or, more generally, with a principle of infinity. Here are some such 
examples. 
  
(a) Incommensurability related to infinity divisibility in geometry 
 
-Proclus, in his Commentary to Euclid (=in Eucliden)37 expresses precisely this link: 
 
‘the irrational38 has a place only where infinite divisibility is possible’. 
 
-Similarly Scholia in Eucliden V.22: 
 
                                                 
37 60,15-16; [Mo], p. 48 
38 By ‘irrational’ is meant ‘incommensurable with respect to some assumed line’. 
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‘There are incommensurable magnitudes, because magnitude is divisible ad infinitum, as the diameter 
is incommensurable to the side.’ 
 
-In the Anonymous Scholion in Eucliden X.1, lines 21-47 it is stated repeatedly that 
the Pythagoreans were relating ‘infinite divisibility’ with incommensurability and 
finite divisibility with commensurability.  
 
[1] According to lines 25-27, the Pythagoreans were the first to discover the method 
of finding the greatest commom measure of two numbers by the process of 
anthyphairesis;  the sentence 
 
 ‘on the one hand every and any number being divided (‘diairoumenon’) according to any cuts leaves 
(‘katalimpanein’) a part least and indivisible’ 
 
describes a process that always ends after a finite number of steps, because the 
remainders are natural numbers that form a strictly decreasing sequence, so that a 
remainder, part (‘morion’), will eventually divide precisely, without remainder, the 
preceding one. This is the content of Propositions VII, 1&2 of the Elements, 
according to which every anthyphairesis between two numbers is finite. 
 
[2]  According to lines 27-31, the Pythagoreans, next, were the first to realise that the 
corresponding  process for geometrical magnitudes need not be finite, but it may 
result in a magnitude being infinitely divisible: 
 
‘but on the other hand every magnitude being divided (‘diairoumenon’) ad infinitum (‘ep’ apeiron’)...’ 
 
Thus a magnitude may well be ‘ep’apeiron diairoumenon’, equivalently ‘ep’ apeiron 
temnomenon’, and result in ‘apeira moria’, each of which is also infinitely divisible.   
This is the content of Proposition X.2 of the Elements, according to which every 
infinite anthyphairesis between two magnitudes results in incommensurability. 
 
[3] According to lines 42-47, the Pythagoreans were thus led to distinguish between 
commensurability and incommensurability for magnitudes. 
 
It is then clear, according to Scholion X.1, 21-47, that the Pythagoreans closely 
connected incommensurability with infinity and infinite divisibility,  
 
-Several ancient comments39 correlate incommensurability with division ad infinitum 
with the argument that (i) the infinite divisibility of a geometric magnitude results in 
smaller and smaller magnitudes with no end, hence in the absence of a least and 
indivisible unit for magnitudes, as is the case with natural numbers, and (ii) the lack 
of a common unit as in numbers implies incommensurability. Statement (i) is true, but 
it is easy to see that Statement (ii) is not true. Indeed, choose and fix a magnitude, say 
a, and let C be the class of all magnitudes of the form ma/n for every natural numbers 
m and n. It is easy to verify that the class C lacks a common unit but that every pair of 
elements in C is a commensurable pair, and thus presents a counterexample to 
Statement (ii). 
Thus the only valid correlation between incommensurability and infinite divisibility in 
geometry is anthyphairetic, namely via Proposition X.2 of the Elements. 
                                                 
39Heron, Definitiones 136,34 (=Scholia in Eucliden X.9), Proclus, in Eucliden 278,19-24 (= 
Xenocrates, Fragment 131, 18-22), Scholia in Eucliden X.28 
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-Proclus, in his Commentary to Euclid (=in Eucliden)40 connects incommensurability 
with an infinite regress of decreasing gnomons, an infinity that can only refer to 
anthyphairetic division41: 
 
‘The statement that every ratio is irrational (‘arretos’) belongs to arithmetic only and not at all to 
geometry, for geometry contains irrational ratios. Likewise the definition of gnomons of  squares  
according to the lower limit (‘kata to elasson’) is peculiar to arithmetic; in geometry a least 
(‘elachiston’) gnomon has no place at all.’ 
 
(b) Incommensurability connected to a principle of infinity  
 
-According to Iamblichus42 the Pythagoreans believed that the mathematical 
knowledge on incommensurability and irrationality they had discovered should be 
kept secret, and he who makes it public is to meet with divine justice by drowning in 
the sea. At first glance the reader might simply think that there is nothing special with 
drowning in the sea, and the choice of punishment is of no importance. Indeed, what 
might be the link between incommensurability and the sea? The answer is given with 
clarity in the Pappus’ Commentary to Book X of the Elements43, partly preserved in 
the Anonymon Scholion in Eucliden X.1, 70-79; according to this passage the 
Pythagoreans believed that anyone who would have the temerity, despite oaths of 
secrecy to the contrary, to make public the secret mathematical dogmas on 
incommensurability and irrationality (‘alogon’), would be punished by divine justice  
by drowning into the ‘infinite sea of dissimilarity’,  of the  Politicus 273d6-e1 
pssage44. This symbolic (or real) story reveals the direct link that the Pythagoreans 
believed existed between incommensuraility and infinity.  
 
-The Pythagorean principle of Infinity, specifically inspired from their association 
with Mathematics, according to Aristotle’ Metaphysica45, is clearly described, by 
Aristotle, in Physica46, Simplicius in his Commentary on Physica47, and Philoponus, 
                                                 
40 60,9-12 
41 The connection is suggested in detail in [N2]. 
42 De Communi Mathematica Scientia 25,27-33, De Vita Pythagorica 18, 88,13-89,1; 34,246,10-247,14 
43 cf. Thomson [Thoms]  
44 Proclus, in several cases, refers to precisely this passage of the Politicus and in every case he 
identifies ‘ton apeiron pontoon tes anomoiotetos’ with the Pythagorean infinity and with the Platonic 
Philebean infinity. Some of these references by Proclus are as follows:  
eis Timaion 1,113,29-31 (where it is identified with ‘ton ponton tes geneseos’, the expression in the 
Anonymon Scholion ), 1,175,18-24 (where it is stated that the Platonic ‘ton apeiron pontoon tes 
anomoiotetos’ is characterized by infinite divisibility, is identified with ‘ametria’, with the Pythagorean 
principle Apeiron as described in Aristotle’s Metaphusica, with the Apeiron of Philolaos (fragments 
1,2,6)), eis Parmeniden 1009,19-1010,26 (where it is described as a cause of division), eis Alcibiaden 
33,17-34,10 (where it is correlated with divisibility), eis Politeian  2,69,17.  
The second related expression that appears in the Anonymon Scholion to the Elements X.1, 70-79, is 
‘tois astatois reumasin’, the unstable fluctions’ is also in close relation with the Infinite in several 
passages by Iamblichus, Porphyrius and Proclus, as follows: 
Iamblichus, De mysteriis  1,3,19-29 and 7,2,5-11. Porphyrius, eis Politeian, Fragment 92. Proclus,  
eis Politeian 2,157,19-22; 2,261,22-26; 2,264,1-4; 2,275,8-14; 2,347,17-348,16, eis Timaion  1,91,14-
23. 1,344,26-348,7. 1,385,18-386,8. 3,329,4-331,26, eis Alcibiaden 21,8-24,9; 87,4-9;  92,16-93,6; 
143,18-144,1; 173,12-17; eis Parmeniden  910,6-13; 1003,2-6,  Platonic Theology  4,85,17-87,4. 
45 985b23-986a26 and 989b29-990a34 
46 204a8-34, 213b22-29 
47 455,15-459,3 (especially 455,20-456,3) 
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in his Commentary on Physica48, as a division ad infinitum of magnitudes. 
 
-The following explicit link between the philosophical Platonic principle of Infinity in 
the Philebus 16c5-10, 23b-25b and geometric incommensurability is stated in Proclus’ 
Commentary to Euclid49: 
 
‘If there were no [Platonic Philebean  principle of] infinity, all magnitudes would be commensurable 
and there would be nothing‘arrheton’ or ‘alogon’, features that are thought to distinguish geometry 
from arithmetic’. 
 
In the passages cited incommensurability is directly related either to infinite 
divisibility or to a principle of the infinite. In (a) it is clear that ‘infinite divisibility’ is 
directly related to infinite anthyphairesis. In (b) incommensurability is related to a 
philosophical principle of infinity, either Pythagorean or Platonic-Philebean. These 
associations suggest that these philosophic principles of infinity are related to infinite 
anthyphairesis and Proposition X.2 of the Elements. This is not the place to expand on 
this matter, but it should be remarked that the link of both the Pythagorean50 and the 
Philebean51 principle of infinity with incommensurability and Proposition X.2 is 
strong. 
 
Our conclusion is this: even though the term ‘anthyphairesis’ may not, and usually is 
not, explicitly mentioned, there is no other conceivable link of incommensurability 
with infinity in an ancient mathematical or philosophic passage, but the infinity of 
anthyphairesis as described in Proposition X.2 of the Elements.  
 
2.2. The connection between Theodorus’ incommensurability proofs and infinite 
divisibility in Scholia in Platonem 
 
It follows from our comments in 2.1 that an association of incommensurability with infinite 
divisibility should be construed as a strong indication of an anthyphairetic approach to 
incommensurability. Such an association occurs is found in the commentary Scholia in 
Platonem (abbreviated SP) on the following Theaetetus  162e6-7 passage, concerning 
Theodorus’ demonstrations:   
                                                 
48 386,14-395,7 (especially 388,24-389,20) 
49 6,19-22 (translation by G.R. Morrow [Mo], p. 5) 
50 These remarks point to an anthyphairetic interpretation of the Pythagorean principle of infinity. The 
detailed arguments in favour of such an interpretation are given in Negrepontis [N2]. 
51The link between the indefinite dyad, namely the Philebean Infinite, and the side and diameter 
numbers51, the ‘convergents’ closely connected with  infinite anthyphairesis, was realised by Taylor51 
reading some passages of the Epinomis (especially 990b5-991b4).  There is a clearer link of the 
Platonic description  in the Philebus 23b-25b  between the Platonic Philebean principle of Infinity and 
the geometric infinite anthyphairesis. Indeed the Philebean  infinite is described as an ‘indefinite dyad’ 
of two opposites, such as the great and the small or the cold and the warm, which is infinite, an infinite 
process, precisely because at every stage it has the power to renew the initial opposition, while in case 
the dyad cannot at some stage renew this opposition, then it becomes a ‘finite’, characterised  by 
‘commensurability’ (25e1), exactly as in Propositions X.2 & 3 of the Elements finite anthyphairesis is 
characterised by commensurability, and by a relation ‘as number to number’ (25a8), exactly as in 
Propositions X.5 &6 of the Elements finite anthyphairesis is characterised by a relation ‘as number to 
number’. Thus the description of the infinite in the Philebus 23b-25b fits precisely to that of geometric 
infinite anthyphairesis in Propositions X.2-8 of the Elements, and  the Philebean principle of infinity is 
revealed to be a philosophic, dialectic version of the geometrical infinite anthyphairesis. The full 
arguments for an anthyphairetic interpretation of  the Platonic principles of infinite and finite in the 
Philebus 23b-25b are given in Negrepontis [N1]. 
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‘Imagine how utterly worthless Theodorus or any geometer would be if he were prepared to rely on 
probability to do geometry.’ 
 
The commentary in Scholia in Platonem runs  as follows: 
 
‘If we accept the judgement of the many  as the dominant one in geometry, we would be ridiculous  
to claim that  maginitudes are incommensurable to each other, and that the finite line is divisible ad 
infinitum (‘diaireten eis apeiron’), and the like (\ta toiauta’).’ 
 
The following reading of the Commentary is suggested: Theodorus, when proving the 
incommensurabilities of the powers (of 3,5,…,17 feet) with respect to the one foot 
line, employed, not any considerations of probability (which would be worthless and 
make him ridiculous), but  logically impeccable  proofs (‘apodeixin de kai anagken’, 
162e4-5) involving the infinite divisibility (namely the infinite anthyphairesis)  of 
these finite lines with respect to the one foot line.  
 
Thus the commentator suggests that Theodorus’ method of proof is anthyphairetic. It 
may be countered that the two statements in the Scholia: (i) ‘magnitudes are 
incommensurable’ and (ii) ‘the finite line is infinitely divisible’ are independent of 
each other, and that it is not in the intention of the commentator to relate infinite 
divisibility to incommensurability. However the anonymous comment is about 
Theodorus’ demonstrations reported in the Theaetetus 162e6-7, and the only 
Theodorus’ demonstrations mentioned in the Theaetetus were  those reported in 147d-
e, showing  incommensurabilities and infinity of powers, not dividing the line ad 
infinitum for some other purpose. Also, the final term (iii) ‘the like’ (‘ta toiauta’) 
indicates that the two statements (i) and (ii) are closely related.  
 
We must also note that there is nothing paradoxical or against ‘the judgement of the 
many’ and common intuition in the simple divisibility of a line, in dividing, say, each 
part in half ad infinitum; however the incommensurability (and the infinite division of 
a line by anthyphairesis) definitely did run against the opinion of the many (cf. Plato, 
Leges 819d-820b and Aristotle, Metaphysics 983a12-23). 
 
3. The crucial statement: connection with Theodorus’ incommensurability 
demonstrations  
 
The heuristic arguments in section 1.4 cast doubt on the Cherniss and Burnyeat thesis, 
as long as there is no satisfactory interpretation of the crucial statement [b] consistent 
with that thesis. In the present section we will argue, that the Theaetetus 147d3-e1 
passage itself (in 3.1) and the ancient comments on this passage contained in Anonymi 
Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum) (in 3.2) lead to an interpretation of the crucial 
statement [b], radically different from the Burnyeat interpretation, inconsistent with 
the Cherniss-Burnyeat thesis, and suggesting that Plato does indicate that the nature of 
Theodorus’ method of incommensurability proofs is by infinite division, and thus 
anthyphairetic, according to the comments in section 2. 
 
3.1. The connection between the Theaetetus’ and the infinite in the Theaetetus 147d-e 
passage. 
 
The connection between incommensurability and infinity in multitude of every power, 
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suggested in the Scholia in Platonem (Section 2.2), may actually be extracted from a 
careful and novel reading of the Theaetetus 147d-e passage itself. 
 
(a)  The bond between ‘apophainon’ in [a] and ‘ephainonto’ in [b] 
 
It was noted in section 1.4 that Burnyeat, although he is basing his interpretation of 
[b] on the connection of [b] with [a], nevertheless he does not take into account the 
linguistic link with which Plato manifests this connection. Indeed the two words 
‘apophainon’ (147d4) in [a] and ‘ephainonto’ (147d8) in [b], from the same root, set 
up a bond between the two sentences [a] and [b]. It may be countered that mere 
chance brought these two words in close proximity, and no significant conclusion 
need follow from it. But the same bond appears fairly frequently in Plato, in fact a 
little later in the Theaetetus 151d-e and also elsewhere 52, thus strengthening the 
suggestion that Plato had indeed the intention to express by this proximity a logical 
bond. 
 
Not only Burnyeat but scholars and translators in general do not activate this link. 
Thus H.N. Fowler’s  translation renders ‘apophainon’ as ‘showing’ and ‘ephainonto’ 
as ‘appeared’53, M. J. Levett’s ‘apophainon’ as ‘showing’ and ‘ephainonto’ as ‘were 
turning out’54, and W. R. Knorr’s ‘apophainein’ as ‘demonstrating’ and ‘ephainonto’ 
as ‘recognized’55.  
 
But if contact with the original text is to be preserved, the two words ‘apophainon’ 
and ‘ephainonto’ should be rendered with words of the same root. Which words? It 
was argued in section 1.3, following Knorr, that ‘apophainon’ shound be rendered as 
‘was showing’, since Theodorus’ proofs were mathematically rigorous56; on account 
of the link described, ‘ephainonto’ should then be rendered as ‘were shown’. Thus, 
according to [a], Theodorus ‘was showing’ that the powers are incommensurable to 
the one foot line, and, according to [b], for this reason the powers ‘were shown’ to 
Theaetetus and his companion to be infinite in multitude. Thus the fact that   [b] holds 
because [a]  holds, assumed loosely by Burnyeat, indeed follows in precise form from 
the Theaetetus text. But the precise link between [a] and [b] has consequences 
                                                 
52 Cf. Theaetetus 151d7-e7: It appears (‘phainetai’) to me that …[so and so].  Because (‘gar’) of  that  
you  must declare (‘apophainimenon’)…[so and so]. Politeia  470a8-b10: Because (‘heneka’) it 
appears (‘phainetai’)  to me that…[so and so]…, I declare (‘apophainomenou’)  that… [so and so]. 
Politicus 276e10-a6 [in contrapositive manner]: May we declare (‘apophainometha’) that …[so and 
so]? We cannot because it does not yet appear (‘oupo phainetai’ to me…[so and so].  Timaeus 39a4-b2: 
It appeared (‘ephaineto’) that …[so and so];  because (‘gar’)...to appear  (‘apephainen’)... . Similarly, 
Protagoras 340b2-c8 (‘phainetai’, ‘proapophenai’,’ apephenato’), Philebus 67a10-16 (‘phanentos’, 
‘pephantai’, ‘apephenato’). 
53 Theaetetus translation, Loeb edition, p. 25:‘showing that squares …are [[each, distributively]] not 
commensurable in length with the unit of the foot’ vs. ‘since the number of roots appeared to be 
[[collectively]] infinite’. 
54 [Burn2], p. 266.:‘showing that the power of 3 square feet and the power of 5 square feet are [[each, 
distributively]] not commensurable in length with the power of 1 square foot’ vs. ‘since the powers 
were turning out to be [[collectively]] unlimited in numbers’.Burnyeat is following Levett’s 
translation, even  though, as we saw in section 1.4, considers [b] as being thoughts prompted from [a]. 
55 [Kn], p. 62-63:‘demonstrating that these are [[each, distributively]] not commensurable in length 
with the one foot-power’ vs. ‘since we recognized the powers to be [[collectively]] unlimited in 
number’. 
56 AST is freely exchanging ‘apophainon’ with ‘edeiknuen’ 25,42; ‘epedeiknuen’ 28,42; ‘edeiknuen’ 
34,2 and 34,20. 
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contrary to the Cherniss-Burnyeat thesis, as we shall see. 
 
(b)  The distributive sense of the plural ‘hai dunameis’ in the crucial statement [b]  
 
But now the two plurals, ‘ou summetroi’ in [a] and ‘apeiroi to plethos’ in [b], must be 
examined under the light thrown by the existence of the bond between [a] and [b]. We 
note that it makes no sense for the plural ‘ou summetroi’ used in [a] to have a 
collective meaning (such as that somehow they are all together as a totality 
incommensurable), its only possible meaning being distributive57, namely that  
 
‘each of the powers was shown  to be incommensurable to the one foot line’’ 
 
It is then suggested that the plural ‘apeiroi to plethos’ used in [b], bonding in structure 
and meaning with [a], does not have a collective (such as that somehow they are all 
together infinite in multitude), but its meaning must be distributive as well: 
 
[b***] ‘since each of the powers was shown  to be infinite in multitude’.  
 
This is then the rendering we propose for [b], on the basis of the foregoing analysis. 
The same rendering, statement [b***], has been arrived at in section 1.4 by an 
independent route.  
 
Our conclusion is strengthened by the persistence in using distributive plural for ‘hai 
dunameis’ in the sequel 148b1-2: 
 
‘those lines were called powers (‘dunameis’) that were not commensurable (‘ou summetrous’) in 
length to the ‘lengths’, but commensurable in the squares they can (to the squares that the ‘lengths’ 
can).’ 
 
3.2. Connection between proof of incommensurability by Theodorus and the infinite in 
the Anonymous Commentator to Plato’s Theaetetus (AST),36,36-37,29. 
 
The comments in AST for the crucial statement, included in AST 36,36-37,29, 
provide unqualified support for the thesis that the plural (‘hai dunameis apeiroi to 
plethos’) in the crucial Theaetetus 147d7-8 statement is distributive, and that every 
power admits of the infinite separately in a divisional way.  
 
(a) It will be sufficient to confine ourselves in the brief but revealing sentence AST 
36,45-48, appearing as an explanation of the crucial Theaetetus statement : 
   
‘because the lines admit of the indefinite (‘aoriston’) either by increasing (‘auxoi’) or by dividing  
(‘diairoi’) them, [and the lines are limited (‘horizontai’) by numbers, Theaetetus and his companion  
passed over to numbers’]. 
                                                 
57We wish to thank the anonymous referee of an earlier version for bringing our attention to this 
(standard) terminology. ‘A statement in English such as “all squared nonzero real numbers are 
positive” is called a distributive plural.  This means that the statement “the square of x is positive” is 
true for every nonzero real number.  It can be translated directly into: ‘for all x (if x is a non-zero real 
number, then x2 is positive)’.  Not all statements involving  plurals in English are distributive plurals.  
The statement “The agents are surrounding the building” does not imply that Agent James is 
surrounding the building.  This type of statement is called a collective plural.  Such a statement cannot 
be translated directly into a statement involving a universal quantifier.’ (after ‘abstractmath.org’). 
A statement with a collective plural can be translated directly into a set theoretic statement. 
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The meaning of the AST statement is clear enough by itself:  
the infinity that lines (and powers, considered as lines58) admit can be of only two 
kinds, either (a) infinity by division, or (b) infinity by increase, 
but it becomes clearer if we compare it with numerous similar statements from 
ancient authors, both mathematically and philosophically inclined: 
 
Aristotle, Physics 233 a24-26 
‘For, length (‘mekos’), and time, and generally every continuum (‘suneches’) is said to be infinite 
(‘apeiron’) in two senses, either by division (‘kata diairesin’) or by the endpoints (‘tois eschatois’).’ 
 
Heron, Definitiones 119,1,2-3 (=Scholia in Eucliden 5, 4,1-2)  
‘Magnitude is increasing (‘auxanomenon’) and divisible (‘temnomenon’) ad infinitum’ 
 
Themistius, In Aristotelis physica paraphrasis  5,2,187,5-7 
‘infinity has a double meaning for length and for every continuum in general 
either by  being divided (‘diaireisthai’) ad infinitum 
or by the magnitude  having no last point and no limit (‘meden eschaton...mede peras’)’  
  
Proclus, In Eucliden 184, 17-29 
‘…that every magnitude is divisible (‘diaireton’) ad infinitum is a geometric postulate (184, 17-18)… 
and that the quantity increases (‘auxein’) ad infinitum is common to both; for both number and 
magnitude are subject to it (184, 27-29)’ 
 
Proclus, in Eucliden 198,14-15  
‘for every continuum is divisible (‘diaireton’) and increasable (‘auxeton’) ad infinitum’ 
 
Simplicius, Commentary to Aristotle’s Physics 467,8-12  
‘the mathematical magnitudes are divided (‘diaireisthai’) and increased (‘auxesthai’) ad infinitum’ 
 
The comparison of the AST statement 36,45-48 with these statements, and the 
obvious meaning they all have, makes it clear that the plural lines (‘ai grammai’) in 
the AST statement in 36, 45-48 is distributive, since both kinds of infinity are about a 
single initial given line; the line admits of the infinite either because it is divided into 
an infinite multitude of parts, or because it is increased by adding to it an infinite 
multitude of parts. That a given line is divisible (into two lines, hence, recursively, ad 
infinitum) follows essentially from Propositions I.3, 10 of the Elements, and that a 
given line is increasable ad infinitum is the content of the second postulate of the 
Elements.  
 
(b) But now we must also bear in mind that the AST statement in 36, 45-48 is meant 
to be in explanation of the crucial statement Theaetetus 147d7-8, reproduced just 
above in lines 36, 37-40 of AST. 
Thus the crucial statement:  
[b] ‘because the powers were shown to be infinite in multitude’ 
 is read, after the explanation supplied by AST 36,45-48, in a more precise, if forced, 
way as: 
[b1] ‘because the powers were shown to be infinite in multitude either by division or 
by increase’. 
                                                 
58 Cf. footnote 34 
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But now the plural appearing in the statement ceases to be ambiguous and cannot but 
be a distributive plural and thus mean:  
[b2] ‘because each power was shown to be infinite in multitude, either by division or 
by increase’. 
 
This is the third, and most explicit, indication that the plural in the crucial statement is 
a distributive one. 
 
But there is more. A power a  
(i) is according to its definition a fixed finite line (satisfying a2=Nr2 for some non-
square number N) that does not in any way increase, and  
(ii) is infinite in multitude, according to the Theaetetus 147d7-8 crucial statement, just 
analysed.  
Therefore a power cannot possibly admit of the infinite by increasing ad infinitum, 
because then the line would not be fixed and finite (as in (i)).  Thus the only 
possibility left is for the crucial statement is to mean that  
 
[b3] ‘because each power was  shown to be infinite in multitude by division’. 
 
Finally the question arises:  how was such a thing shown? Here the link between 
‘ephainonto’ and the ‘apephenen’, suggested earlier, provides the only reasonable 
explanation:  
 
[a]+[b3] Theodorus showed (‘apephenen’) that each power is not commensurable in 
length to the one foot line, because each power was shown (‘ephainonto’) to be 
infinite in multitude by division. 
 
In turn this can only imply that Theodorus method was anthyphairetic, that Theodorus 
was employing in some form Proposition X.2 of Euclid’s Elements, according to 
which if two unequal magnitudes have an infinite anthyphairesis, then these two 
magnitudes are incommensurable. 
 
3.3. AST 37,23-26: ‘epei apeiroi ephainonto hai kata meke dunameis’ 
 
There are two more versions of the crucial statement in AST 25,40-26,13 and 37, 23-
29. We will consider here the AST 37,23-29 passage, and argue that and it confirms 
both the distributivity of the plural and the connection of infinity and 
incommensurability of each power separately. We will deal with the AST 25,40-26,13 
in section 4.2. 
 
[AST 37,23-29] ‘because the powers according to length (‘hai kata meke dunameis’) were shown to 
be infinite (‘apeiroi’) [[Theaetetus  andhis companion]]  attempted to circumscribe (‘perilabein’) all 
these powers by means of a common name.’ 
 
This version (‘epei apeiroi ephainonto hai kata meke dunameis’, 37,23-26) differs 
from the original at two points: (i) the original ‘apeiroi to plethos’ is shortened to 
‘apeiroi’, a change of convenience; and (ii) the original ‘hai dunameis’ is expanded to 
‘hai kata meke dunameis’. The meaning of this addition (ii) seems to be the 
following: powers can be considered in two ways, as lengths-sides, linearly, and as 
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squares59; infinity of powers was shown by Theodorus only as lengths (‘kata meke’), 
and not as squares. It follows that expansion (ii) makes no sense in the Burnyeat 
interpretation, as all powers taken together, collectively, form an infinite set, 
irrespectively of whether they are considered as  lines or as squares. The appearance 
of infinity for powers as lines and not for powers as squares  makes good sense only if 
we interpret the plural as distributive and the infinity as divisional-anthyphairetic. 
 
 
4. The crucial statement: connection with Theaetetus and his companion’s method  
 
4.1. The connection between the Theaetetus and his companion’s idea and method 
and the infinite in the Theaetetus 147d-e passage. 
 
In section 3 we have examined the meaning of the crucial statement [b] by exploiting 
its connection with Theodorus’ lesson and demonstrations. But the crucial statement 
[b] is transitive from Theodorus’ lesson to Theaetetus and his companion’s idea and 
method, and the meaning of the crucial statement [b] can also be examined by 
exploiting its connection with Theaetetus and his companion’s idea and method.  
 
In the Theaetetus 147d8-148b2 passage the transitive crucial statement [b], ‘since the 
powers were shown to be infinite in multitude’, is followed by the statement that 
Theaetetus and his companion had the idea to collect in one (‘sullabein eis hen’), later 
described as ‘circumscribe’ (‘perilambanein’, 148d6, the powers (147d8). For this 
goal, they divided the set of all numbers in square and non-square numbers (147e5-
148a4), and they defined line a, such that a2=Cr2, where r is the one foot line, length if 
C is a square number and power if C is non-square. Thus in a power there is 
incommensurability of sides and commensurability of squares (148a6-b2)60. This 
approach is judged as quite successful by Socrates, to the point that it must be taken 
as model of imitation for his philosophical quest on the meaning of knowledge (148c-
d). However from Plato’s account, just outlined, the mathematical method and 
contribution by Theaetetus and his companion is by no means clear61, although it is 
generally related to Proposition X.9 of the Elements.  
 
As we will see, the Anonymous Commentator AST throws substantial light on their 
method. Our interest in the present paper is limited to the light thrown in relation to 
the crucial statement [b], and we will be content with some heuristic comments for 
anything beyond that goal. 
 
(a) In general infinity is circumscribed by means of a whole entity 
 
According to AST 37,3-12, it is a general mathematical and philosophic principle that 
whenever an infinity occurs, there must be an attempt to collect (‘sullabein’ 
Theaetetus 147d8) - circumscribe (‘perilambanein’, Theaetetus 148d6; AST 26,11; 
37,5; 37,10; 37,29; 37,43; 37,46; 45,48; 46,39) - define (‘horizein’, AST 37,1;37,11) - 
limit (‘periorizein’, AST 42,32) -  subjugate (‘hupotaxai’, AST 26,12) the infinity in 
question.  
 
                                                 
59 Cf. footnote 34 
60 Cf. footnote 34 
61 {Burn1], p. 505-509 
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[AST 37,3-12] ‘because the infinite (‘apeiron’) is uncircumscribed (‘aperilepton’) and indefinite 
(‘aoriston’), intelligible thought (‘dianoia’)  must, to the extent possible, circumscribe 
(‘perilambanein’) and define (‘horizein’) it by means of a whole entity (‘katholiko tini’).  
 
Thus in order to circumscribe an infinite a one and whole entity must be found, if 
possible. 
 
(b) Theaetetus and his companion achieved the circumscription of the infinity in 
powers (147d7-8) by passing over to numbers (147d8-148b2) 
 
In order to achieve the desired circumscription of the specific infinite of powers that 
arises in the Theaetetus 147d7-8 crucial passage, Theaetetus and his companion 
passed over to numbers: 
 
[AST 36,45-37,3]  ‘because the lines admit of the indefinite (‘aoriston’) either by increase (‘auxoi’) 
or by division (‘diairoi’), and the lines are limited (‘horizontai’) by numbers, Theaetetus  and his 
companion passed over  to numbers’. 
 
(c) The three steps in Theaetetus and his companion’ s method 
 
Thus we are informed that Theaetetus and his companion in their attempt to 
circumscribe the infinite in powers (i) passed over (from the infinite) to numbers (b), 
and (iii) the infinite was indeed circumscribed by means of an entity described as One 
and Whole. There is thus an imlied missing link (ii) from the numbers to the One and 
Whole entity. 
We thus concude that Theaetetus and his companion achieved the circumscription of 
the infinity of a power in three steps: 
(i) from the infinite of a power they passed over to numbers (by (b)); 
(ii) the passage over to numbers allows for the formation of an entity which is 
described as one/whole (‘katholiko tini’)/logos and whose name serves as the name of 
all (the infinite parts); and, 
(iii) by means of the one and whole entity the infinite is circumscribed (by (a)).   
 
Step (i) is explained in AST in unambiguous terms, as we describe in (d). For the 
purpose of the present work it is not necessary to commit ourselves as to (and 
subsequently attempt to establish) the precise meaning of the entity described as 
one/whole/logos (step (ii)) and of the circumscription and definition of the specific 
infinite that results in the Theaetetus 147d7-148b2 passage (step (iii)) and is meant to 
give an account of the important mathematical achievement of Theaetetus and his 
companion. But some informal remarks, which will not be used for drawing 
conclusions about our sole interest in this paper, which is the use of infinity in the 
crucial statement [b], may be helpful and hopefully illuminating and will be given in 
(e). 
 
(d) The nature of step (i)  
 
[1] By [AST 44,50-45,5] the passage over to numbers [step (i)] is more carefully 
expressed as the passage from magnitudes to numbers. 
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[AST 44,50-45,5] ‘Theaetetus and young Socrates passed over from the less clear to the more 
clear, and to the more whole (‘ta katholikotera’) because they passed over from magnitudes to 
numbers.’ 
 
[2] By [AST 26,13-18] by the expression ‘the passage over to numbers’ [in step (i)] 
the expression  ‘the passage to a ratio ‘as number to number’’, a ratio that is always 
commensurable’ is meant. 
 
[AST 26,13-18] ‘thus they came (‘elthon’)62 to number as a consequence (‘dia to akolouthon ?’63) 
of the fact that all the numbers are commensurable to each other’, 
 
We may infer from [1] and [2] that 
[3] the passage over to numbers [step (i)] is really the passage from a ratio of 
magnitude to magnitude to a ratio described ‘as number to number’, equivalently as a  
commensurable ratio. 
 
Expanding, in AST 41,17-45,5 on the quite brief Theaetetus 148b2 passage, to a 
power-length approach for cubes similar to that of squares the Anonymous 
Commentator explains:  
 
[AST 42,13-33] ‘for the cube itself to the cube has commensurable ratio, as number to number, 
while the sides are incommensurable ,,, thus (‘oun’) for the solids as well they passed over to numbers 
in order to set a limit (‘periorisosi’) by means of a whole entity’,  
 
We infer from  [AST 42,13-33] and [3], (modifying it an obvious way from cubes to 
squares and) making use of  the propositions, stated and proved as   Propositions 5, 6 
of Book X of the Elements stating that the ratio of two magnitudes is commensurable 
if and only if that ratio is as number to number, that 
 
[4] for the power defined by the equality a2=Cr2, where r is the one foot line and C a 
non-square number, the commensurable as number to number ratio is the 
commensurable ratio a2 to r2, equal to the number to number ratio C to 1, and the 
magnitude to magnitude ratio is the incommensurable ratio a to r. 
 
We infer from [3] and [4] that 
 
[5] step (i), namely the passage over to numbers is the passage from the 
incommensurable [magnitude to magnitude] ratio a to r to the commensurable as 
number to number ratio a2 to r2, namely the passage obtained by squaring from the 
incommensurable ratio of the sides a to r to the commensurable ratio as the number C 
to number 1 ratio of the squares a2 to r2. 
 
At this point we take into account (b) above, namely that  
[6] by [AST 36,45-37,3 & 37,3-12] the passage over to numbers [step (i)] was 
undertaken by Theaetetus and his companion for the purpose of circumscribing and 
limiting the infinite in powers [step (iii)]. 
 
Combining [5] and [6] we see that  
                                                 
62 Cf. AST 42,3 for accepting ‘elthon’ as equivalent to ‘metebesan’ 
63 Cf. AST 47,46-47 and 63,48 for similar expressions. 
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[7] step (i), on the one hand, by [5], is a step from incommensurability to 
commensurability, while on the other hand, by [6], is a step from the infinity of 
powers to a condition that prepares the ground for limiting and circumscribing the 
infinite.  
 
Thus the infinity of powers must be closely related to incommensurability of powers 
to the one foot line, while commensurability of their squares must be instrumental for 
the circumscription and limiting of the infinite. But the only conceivable relation of 
commensurability and as number to number ratio to the finite is the known 
proposition that finite anthyphairesis characterises commensurability; and the only 
possible relation of incommensurability to the infinite is the known proposition that 
anthyphairetic division ad infinitum characterises incommensurability (Propositions 
X.2 & 3 of the Elements and the discussion in section 1.3). We conclude that  
 
[8] the infinity of the powers in the crucial sentence [b] in the Theaetetus 147d7-8 is 
the infinity that passed over to numbers, and is thus the infinity of anthyphairesis 
resulting from the incommensurability of the power with respect to the one foot line, 
and  
 
[9] the passage to numbers is the passage by squaring to the commensurability, and 
resulting finite anthyphairesis, of the square a2 with respect to the one foot square r2, a 
passage from the infinite to the finite [step (i)] meant to produce an entity described as 
One and Whole [step (ii)], by means of which the initial antyphairetic infinite of the 
power is circumscribed and limited [step (iii)]. 
 
It is clear from [8] (and [9]), clarifying step (i) of Theaetetus and his companion  
contribution, that the AST commentary on the Theaetetus and his companion idea and 
mathematical discovery that the crucial statement [b] in Theaetetus 147d7-8 is in 
opposition to the Burnyeat interpretation, supporting the distributive plural, and is in 
opposition to Cherniss Byurnyeat neutrality thesis, supporting  the anthyphairetic 
interpretation.  
 
(e) Heuristics on the nature of steps (ii) and (iii) 
 
The process described as circumscribing the infinite does not mean that the original 
infinite ceases to be infinite, on the contrary it remains infinite, a circumscribed and 
limited infinite.64 Circumscription is a circular containment with a strong connotation 
of circularity and periodicity65. So in the case of the infinity-incommensurability of a 
                                                 
64 As is made clear e.g. in Plotinus, Enneades 2,4,16; 6,6,3,9-16, in the infinite of Division and 
Collection,  and Iamblichus, De Communi Mathematica Scientia 3. 
65Cf. a non-exhaustive sample: Republic 546b4 ‘periodos…perilambanei’ (cf. Proclus, eis Politeian 
2,30,10-14 adds ‘anakukleisthai…apokathistamenon’); Sophistes 235a-c , ‘perilambanein’ assumes an 
expressly circular character of containment: ‘we have got him into a kind of encircling net (‘auton  
perieilephamen en amphiblestriko tini’, 235b1); Timaeus 32c5-34a7 the sphere is ‘perieilephos’ all the 
other figures. The same is true in Euclid, Elements Definitions XI. 14,18, 21and Propositions XIII.13-
17. Plotinus, Enneades 2,2,1,11 ‘kuklo’…‘perilambanein’; 5,1,8,18-22 ‘sphairas’…’perieilemmena’; 
6,4,2,35-36 ‘perilabein’ associated with ‘perithein’; 6,4,2,35-36‘kuklo’…‘perilabein’;6,8,18 (similar); 
6,8,11,22-37 (similar). Iamblichus, De Mysteriis 1,9,31 ‘kuklo perilabein’. Porphyrius, In Aristotelis 
categorias 4,1,120,16 ‘kuklo perilabein’. Galenus, In Hippocratis librum de officinamedici 
commentarii 18b, 712,14 ‘kuklo…perilabein’.Proclus, eis Timaion 1,209,26-‘kuklo perieileptai’; 
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power, which as mentioned in (a) is anthyphairetic, a reasonable interpretation of the 
circumscription of infinity (step (iii)) would be a circular, periodic anthyphairesis. 
This is in full agreement with the mathematics as we know it, since the anthyphairesis 
of every power is indeed known to be periodic66. Periodicity of anthyphairesis is 
closely related to a deep and seemingly paradoxical sense of Oneness, namely that of 
the Whole that cannot be destroyed but remains whole after any division, namely an 
entity in which every part of the whole is the same as the whole, a description that fits 
with the ‘whole’ (‘holon’) and ‘one’, as described in the Parmenides 142d-e, 144b-
145a, Sophistes 245a, and Philebus 15a-b. Thus step (iii) may reasonably be said to be 
caused by an entity that may be described as One and Whole (step (ii)). 
 
Stated in mathematical language, [9] tells that Theaetetus & his companion achieved 
the circumscription of the infinite for powers, namely the periodicity of the 
anthyphairesis of each power, infinite because of incommensurability, because in 
powers it is possible to pass over by squaring from the incommensurability-infinity of 
the power to the commensurability-finiteness. Thus, according to the Theaetetus 
account in 147d7-148b28 and the AST commentary on that account, Theaetetus and 
his companion discovered and proved the following fundamental 
 
Proposition. If a is a power (namely, if a2=Cr2 for some non-square number C, where 
r is the one foot line), 
then   
(i) a is incommensurable to r, and 
(ii) the anthyphairesis of a to r is periodic by means of the logos criterion.  
 
The statement of this proposition is closely related to Proposition X.9 of the 
Elements67. 
 
4.2. AST 26,6-8: ‘epei toinun apeira en ta toiauta tetragona’  
 
We finally examine the AST 25,40-26,13 passage, containing a version of the crucial 
statement [b]. In it there is no mention of the term ‘power’, but only of ‘square’68; it 
starts with the phrase corresponding to the Theaetetus 147d3-6,  
  
‘Theodorus was proving (‘edeiknuen’) to those around Theaetetus that the three-foot and the five-foot, 
is incommensurable [to the one foot square] according to the sides (‘kata tas pleuras’), from which 
each was produced.  And numbering (‘exarithmoumenos’) the incommensurable squares ‘(ta 
asummetra tetragona’) came till as far as the 17-foot square.’ 
 
Now AST comes to a version of the crucial statement [b], involving squares: 
 
‘Because these (‘toiauta’) squares were infinite (‘apeira’), those around Theaetetus attempted to 
circumscribe by means of some whole entity, so as to subjugate by means of a single name’. 
                                                                                                                                            
1,247,16-248,6 ‘perilambanein…peritheon…peri kentron…perichoreuontos autou kuklo’; 2,71,16-72,5 
‘perileptikon’…’sphairikon’; 2,109,1-; 3,272,22- ‘kata tina periodon’…’he periodike 
poiesis’…’perilabein’; In Parmeniden 807,24 ‘perilabein’ … ’perithei’ … ’perichoreuei kuklo’. 
Syrianos, eis Hermogenen, 11,2 ‘kuklo perilambanein’. Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros 
commentaria 9,62,19-20 ‘perilabon kuklo’. 
66 In other words, the continued fraction of a quadratic irrational is (eventually) periodic (cf. [F], 9.1). 
67 As pointed out in Scholion in Eucliden X.62, the hypothesis of Proposition X.9 is more general than 
that of the Proposition implied in the Theaetetus text. Cf. [Burn1], p. 505-509. 
68 Cf. footnote 34 
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The ‘toiauta’ squares in 26,7 refers to the incommensurable (‘asummetra’) squares, as 
in 26,2-3, with the understanding, as in 25,48-49, that they are incommensurable 
according to the sides (‘kata tas pleuras’), and thus the phrase 
‘epei toinun apeira en ta toiauta tetragona’ (26,6-8) 
should be read as 
‘epei toinun apeira en ta asummetra kata tas pleuras tetragona’. 
 
The statement, considered by itself, is ambiguous: it is not clear if ‘ta tetragona’ is a 
distributive or collective plural. The similarity of this statement with the statement  
 
‘because powers according to lengths were infinite’ (AST 37, 23-26),  
 
examined in section 3.3, in which the corresponding plural was found to be 
distributive, might suggest that the plural here is distributive too. But the stronger 
argument for distributivity is the fact that the statement in question [AST 25,40-26,13]  
is followed by the statement [AST 26,13-18], which, in section 4.1 (d) [2] above, was 
shown to be a passage from the infinite over to numbers, namely to commensurability 
and finiteness, and thus a passage from  the incommensurable infinite, an infinite that 
makes sense only for each power or square separately. This shows the distributive and 
anthyphairetic interpretation of the statement in question. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Scholars have suggested various reconstructions for the incommensurability proofs of 
Theodorus’ lesson in the Theaetetus 147d3-e1 passage, either anthyphairetic (notably 
by Zeuthen, Becker, van der Waerden) or non-anthyphairetic (notably by Hardy & 
Wright and Knorr), but the dominant view has been the thesis by Cherniss and 
Burnyeat on the neutrality of the platonic text in relation to any of these 
reconstructions.  
 
The weak points of Knorr’s reconstruction, according to which Theodorus ended his 
demonstrations before the case C=17, were discussed in section 1.1, while the 
argument by Knorr on the impossibility of a rigorous proof of Proposition X.2 of the 
Elements was countered in section 1.3, with the result that the possibility of an 
anthyphairetic method for Theodorus’ demonstrations not to be excluded. 
 
The difficulty with Burnyeat’s interpretation of the crucial sentence in the Theaetetus 
147d7-8 was discussed in section 1.4, resulting in a problem for the Cherniss-
Burnyeat neutrality thesis. 
 
The anthyphairetic nature of the correlation of incommensurability with either infinite 
divisibility or a principle of the infinite is discussed in section 2.1. The anthyphairetic 
interpretation of Theodorus method of proof is based on the argument that the crucial 
statement ’because the powers were shown to be infinite in multitude’ in 147d7-8 is 
interpreted according to the existing evidence, only with the adoption of a distributive plural, 
contrary to the Burnyeat interpretation, resulting for an anthyphairetic method for Theodorus’ 
proofs of incommensurability, contrary to the Cherniss-Burnyeat neutrality thesis. The 
distributive and anthyphairetic approach is supported not only by the Theaetetus 147d3-e1 
passage itself (in 3.1), but also by the relevant comments in Scholia in Platonem (2.2) and 
extensively in the Anonymi Commentarius In Platonis Theaetetum (3.2, 3.3 and 4).  
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On the basis of these arguments we conclude (a) that the only credible non-
anthyphairetic reconstruction, namely the one by Hardy and Wright, is excluded, 
because it is inconsistent with the distributive interpretation of the crucial statement, 
and (b) that contrary to the neutrality thesis of Cherniss and Burnyeat, Plato does 
inform the reader on the nature of the method of Theodorus proof of 
incommensurabilities and that Theodorus’ method of proof is anthyphairetic.  
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